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personalised	 rule	 that	derives	 its	 legitimacy	 from	aggressive	


















president’s	worldview	and	his	 vision	of	 the	 threats	 faced	by	
Russia.	Other,	more	moderate	groups,	 such	as	businessmen,	


























of	 control	 over	 development.	 This	 priority	 has	 prevented	
a	 diversification	 of	 the	 Russian	 economy,	 promoted	 the	
centralisation	 of	 decision-making	 processes,	 exacerbated	













ards	 of	 living,	which	 have	 hitherto	 provided	 the	 leadership	
with	undiminished	popularity.	However,	the	government	has	
been	able	to	effectively	make	up	for	the	sacrifices	that	people	
have	had	 to	make	 over	 the	 course	 of	 the	 last	 year,	 using	 an	
authoritarian	 consolidation	 fuelled	 by	 an	 actively	 promoted	
sense	 of	 threat	 from	 the	 ‘hostile’	West	 and	pride	 in	Russia’s	
territorial	conquests.	The	attitudes	of	Russian	society	at	large	
are	helpful	 in	maintaining	the	current	authoritarian	model,	
which	 is	 being	 held	 together	 by	 social	 apathy,	 atomisation,	
mutual	distrust	and	the	lack	of	horizontal	social	relations	that	
could	give	rise	to	lasting	civil	society	structures.	The	trauma	
of	 the	 Soviet	Union’s	 collapse,	which	 is	 still	 alive	 in	 Russia,	
makes	 people	more	 susceptible	 to	 the	 government’s	 imperi-





























and	 imposes	 the	 logic	of	a	constant	extension	of	 the	 leader’s	
rule.	As	 the	 last	 15	years	of	Russia’s	history	have	shown,	 the	
most	effective	way	to	consolidate	power	and	boost	the	popu-

































































extent),	 i.e.	 the	 liberal	 economic	 reforms	 initiated	 after	 Putin	
came	to	power	in	2000,	or	the	 liberal	modernisation	rhetoric	of	
Dmitry	Medvedev’s	presidency	 (2008–2012).	The	effects	of	 those	
efforts	were	 limited	and	 short-lived	because	many	of	 the	meas-
ures	taken	were	merely	illusory	(e.g.	Medvedev’s	modernisation	
rhetoric),	or	stumbled	on	a	fundamental	obstacle	stemming	from	
the	very	nature	of	the	system,	i.e.	the primacy of control over 
























affect	Russia.	 This	 consolidated	 the	 authoritarian	nature	 of	 the	
Russian	state,	but	at	the	same	time	made	the	leadership	hostage	
to	its	own	policy,	especially	the	decision	to	annex	Crimea,	which	



















to	 Russia’s	 further	 economic	 and	 social	 degradation,	 and	 limits	




rent	 condition	 after	 15	 years	 of	 Vladimir	 Putin’s	 rule.	 The	 first	
chapter	describes	 the	main	 features	of	 the	 system	of	power,	 its	
main	actors	and	decision-making	processes,	as	well	as	the	chal-




















I. PutInISm: SucceSSIve StageS  
of authorItarIanISm
From	 the	 start,	 terminology	 associated	with	 authoritarian	 sys-
tems	 has	 been	 applied	 in	 describing	 Vladimir	 Putin’s	 rule,	 al-
though	the	notions	used	have	ranged	from	milder	ones	referring	
to	so-called	‘democracy	with	adjectives’	(controlled	or	façade	de-










ingly	 more	 authoritarian and repressive.	 This	 evolution	 is	
indicative	of	the	Kremlin’s	strategic	choice	made	in	the	wake	of	












ing	 for	 an	 evolutionary	 variant,	 i.e.	 Medvedev’s	 re-election,	 as	























One	 of	 the	 main	 symptoms	 of	 the	 system’s	 evolution	 concerns	













elite.	However,	 since	Putin’s	return	 in	2012,	 the	Russian	 leader-
ship	has	stepped	up	efforts	 to	develop	a	 state	 ideology	based	on	
a	specific	version	of	conservatism	rooted	in	‘traditional’	Orthodox	
values.3	The	Kremlin’s	 conservatism	 is	 supposed	 to	 serve	as	 the	
regime’s	ideological	foundation	and	justify	the	preservation	of	the	
2	 Aired	on	public	television	on	26	April	2015,	the	documentary	The President. 
























ideology	which,	 in	 the	Kremlin’s	view,	 is	 incompatible	with	 the	
Russian	reality,	and	as	a	justification	for	the	policy	of	confronta-
tion	with	 the	Western	world,	which	 is	 presented	 as	 a	 source	 of	
‘alien’	 values	 and	 an	 aggressor	 in	Russia’s	 sphere	 of	 vital	 inter-
ests.	 For	 the	needs	of	 the	 state	 ideology,	 the	Russian	 leadership	
and	 its	 loyal	 experts	 have	 also	 constructed	 a	 specific	 histori-
cal policy,	 wherein	 the	 interpretations	 of	 history	 are	 adjusted	
to	current	political	needs.	For	instance,	the	victory	over	fascism	








The	social contract between the leader and the public	has	also	






which	 the	Russians	have	been	 forced	 to	make	as	a	 result	of	 the	
4	 See	Marek	Menkiszak,	The	Putin	doctrine:	The	formation	of	a	conceptual	
framework	for	Russian	dominance	in	the	post-Soviet	area,	OSW Commen-



































the evolution of the leader’s position in the system of power 












































made	the main	decision maker increasingly isolated in terms 
of access to information,	 as	 the	 services	 have	 been	 providing	
the	president	with	a	selective	view	of	the	world	largely	driven	by	
wishful	thinking.	The	secret	services’	monopoly	on	information	
reinforces	 the	Kremlin’s	vision	and	 its	 geopolitical	priorities	by	









tional	 staff,	 fully	controlling	his	daily	 functioning,	personal	re-
lations	and	physical	security.	This	has	 left	 the	president	 largely	
a	hostage to the security service people around him,	quite	in	
contrast	to	the	impression	of	one-man	leadership	that	he	has	been	
ostensibly	making,	and	 the	undisputed	 fact	 that	 the	main	deci-
sion-making	mechanisms	are	concentrated	in	his	hands.	
At	the	same	time,	the	president	has	been	increasingly	alienated	
from the broader political and business elites. Putin	has	been	
emphasising	 the	 single-handed	 nature	 of	 important	 decisions	
ever	 more	 frequently,	 often	 confronting	 his	 own	 political	 and	
8	 Nikolai	Patrushev,	secretary	of	the	Security	Council	of	the	Russian	Federa-
tion,	said	that	the	United	States	“wished	Russia	to	cease	to	exist	as	a	state”.	


















The	elite	groups	 in	question,	 i.e.	members	of	 the	state	adminis-
tration,	 business	 and	 expert	 and	 research	 communities,	 have	
lost	 their	 influence	 on	 the	 decision-making	 processes	 concern-






to	 implement	strategies	 that	have	already	been	decided.	This	 il-
lustrates	 the	 change	 that	has	occurred	 in	 the	general	nature	of	
the	Kremlin’s relations with the broader elites –	whereby	posi-
tive	instruments	(distribution	of	assets	and	promotions,	guaran-













































Russian	 economy	–	 and	on	 their	 own	personal	 interests.12	Once	





a	drastic	narrowing	of	 the	 limits	of	 that	political	 and	 social	 ac-
tivity	that	remains	uncontrolled	by	the	Kremlin.	The	regime	has 
increasingly been penalising any opposition or independent 
social and political activity,	starting	from	the	condemnation	of	
opponents	as	a	 ‘fifth	column’	or	 ‘foreign	agents’,13	 to	persecution	
and	 repression	 (a	 larger	number	of	 custodial	 sentences,	 includ-


































unfettered.14	 In	addition	 to	curbing	political	and	civil	 freedoms,	
the	regime	has	also	started	to	systematically	restrain individual 
freedoms and encroach on the sphere of public morals.15
As	the	system	has	been	evolving,	so	its	modus operandi	has	been	










presidential	 decrees	 are	 implemented	 in	 a	 dilatory	 manner	 or	








































formal rules not grounded in law and on personal relations 
and arrangements has	 likewise	been	a	double-edged	sword	for	






political	 leadership,	 and	 the	 recurrent	 ‘redistributions’	 of	 their	
assets	remind	them	of	this	dependence.18	However,	such	a	system	
does	not	offer	any	reliable	guarantees	to	the	members	of	the	nar-





Dmitry	 Medvedev’s	 short	 presidency	 demonstrated,	 even	 ‘con-
trolled	 succession’	 is	 seen	 as	 a	 risk;	 the	 potential	 emancipation	
of	 the	new	president	would	have	entailed	painful	 losses	 for	 the	

































the	 suppression	of	 competition	–	has	 led	 to	a	 situation	 is	which	
the economic model based on revenues from energy resources 













provided	 to	 many	 unprofitable	 enterprises;	 a	 poor	 investment	




competitiveness	 of	 production	 in	many	 sectors	 of	 the	 economy	
and	made	them	more	dependent	on	imports.






























regional	 levels,	and	 inertia	and	 incompetence	 in	 the	administra-
tion.	This	has	lowered	the	quality	of	many	strategic	decisions,	and	
derailed	even	those	rare	attempts	at	reform	or	modernisation	that	
the	Russian	 leadership	undertook	 in	 the	 last	 15	years.	Active	and	













The	collapse	of	the	welfare state model in	Russia,	which	used	to	
be	presented	in	the	Kremlin’s	propaganda	as	one	of	Russia’s	great-
est	achievements	throughout	Putin’s	rule,	marks	another	socially	
painful	 failure	 of	 the	 Putinist	 system,	 and	 runs	 counter	 to	 the	

























in	 charge	 of	 providing	 social	 services,	 i.e.	 healthcare,	 education	
and	research,	and	municipal	infrastructures,	which	are	in	deplor-
able	condition,	especially	outside	the	large	cities.23	The	scale	of	the	
unsolved	 problems	 reveals	 itself,	 for	 instance,	 in	 the	 president’s	
annual	televised	conferences	with	the	inhabitants	of	the	Russian	










culture)	 in	 the	 central	 budget	 has	 also	 been	 cut	 in	 recent	 years,	
which	 stands in contrast to the constant growth of security 




























II. a SocIety of obServerS – the factor that 
KeePS the regIme together





































































models	 to	 Russia,	 and	 championing	 a	 specifically	 Russian	 path	
of	development.	The	Russian	 leadership’s	main	postulate	 in	this	
context	has	concerned	 the	need	 to	preserve	traditionally rus-
sian social and political values,	a	move	intended	indirectly	to	
legitimise	the	traditionalist,	authoritarian	model	of	government.
Other	factors	that	have	contributed	to	the	persistence	of	the	au-
thoritarian	model	 in	 Russia	 concern	 the	 negative	 attitudes	 and	
behaviour	patterns	rooted	in	Russian	society,	 i.e.	 the	passivity, 



























and	disbelief	 that	 their	 endeavours	 could	 be	 successful	 (‘I	 can’t	
change	anything’),	and	do	not	have	the	skills	 to	 take	grassroots	
action	and	co-operate	with	other	people	with	similar	interests	or	




















entails	 some	 negative	 consequences	 for	 the	 government.	While	
the	popularity	showings	of	the	Russian	leadership	and	especially	
















the	 president	 are	 high,	 the	quality of the people’s support is 
questionable;	it	is	usually	passive,	and	does	not	mobilise	people	




80%	will	 not	 translate	 into	 tangible	 support	 from	his	 backers.32	
Russian	society	has	also	demonstrated	a	tendency	to	easily	divert	













































simplified	 terms	as	urban middle class	 and	which	 account	 for	




lief	 that	 the	middle	 classes	 could	 be	 the	 vectors	 of	 a	 new,	 non-
Soviet	awareness	and	political	culture,	and	could	be	the	subjects	
of	modernisation.35	However,	 a	 closer	 look	 at	 the	 values	 and	 at-
titudes	of	the	Russian	middle	class	revealed	that	its	expectations	
concerning	change	were	very	limited,	and	reform	of	the	political	
sphere	played	only	a	minor	role	 in	 them.	The	middle	class	 is	as	
diverse	in	terms	of	values	as	Russian	society	is	as	a	whole.	Values	










































This	 is	 largely	 due	 to	 the	 specificity	 and	 origins	 of	 the	Russian	
middle	class,	which	is	a	product of the period of oil-based pros-
perity under	 Putin.	 Administration	 officials,	 including	 mem-
bers	of	the	institutions	of	force,37	account	for	a	large	part	of	this	
group,	which	also	includes	a	considerable	number	of	people	who	
are	 formally	 private	 entrepreneurs	 or	 members	 of	 the	 liberal	
professions	but	have	economic	links	with	the	state,	that	is,	they	
benefit	from	public	procurement,	make	money	off	providing	ser-
vices	 to	 the	public	 sector,	etc.	This	generates	complex	 identities	
and	complicated	motivations	 in	 relations	with	 the	 state;	 on	one	







themselves	 have	 also	 been	 beneficiaries.38	 For	 a	majority	 of	 the	
Russian	middle	class,	the	case	of	Ukraine	(and	especially	the	ca-























































incapable	of	building a neo-totalitarian system	 involving	 the	
mobilisation	of	the	public	and	mass	repression.	The	obstacles	that	
prevent	 such	 a	 course	 include	both	 the	 lack	 of	 an	 effective	 and	
39	 The	SME	sector	has	shrunk	by	around	a	million	people.	For	more	informa-





































III. the outlooK for the future – change  
of the leaderShIP or the SyStem?
The	Putinist	model	of	state	is	facing	the	prospect	of	degradation 
















































factors	in	Russia	which	increase	the system’s potential to endure,	



























The	 dominant	 view,	 also	 outside	 Russia,	 is	 that	 Vladimir	 Putin	
could	 only	 be	 replaced	 by	 ‘someone	 even	worse’,	 such	 as	 a	more	




















At	 present,	 Putin’s	 inner	 circle,	 consisting	 of	 past	 and	 present	
members	of	the	secret	services,	has	the	greatest	and	most	direct	
influence	 on	 the	 Russian	 leader’s	 position	 and	 continued	 rule.	









identify	 the	 relations	within	 the	 system,	 the	 shifting	 interests	
and	ambitions	of	individual	actors.	As	researchers	argue,	in	the	
event	 of	 a	 ‘palace	 coup’,	 the	 criteria	 guiding	 the	 elite	members	
conducting	the	coup	are	very	far	from	what	is	considered	as	pub-

































Another	 challenge	 to	 the	 current	 personalised	 regime	 and	 Pu-
tin’s	position	comes	from	the	need	to	constantly	demonstrate the 


















a	 convincing	 strategy	 for	 solving	 Russia’s	 deepening	 economic	
problems	 or	 offer	 a	 vision	 of	 Russia’s	 further	 development.	 Fi-
nally,	his	ten-day	disappearance	in	March	2015	also	created	a	bad	
impression,	as	it	triggered	a	wave	of	speculations	about	his	health	
and	 plastic	 surgery	 procedures	 that	 he	was	 allegedly	 undergo-
























sian	 leadership	has	 followed	 the	path	of	undemocratic	 regimes,	
which	 often	 start	 by	 carrying	 out	 reforms	 in	 the	 spirit	 of	 ‘en-




sonal	security.	this makes a peaceful succession less likely to 
happen and	 imposes	 the	 logic	of	extending	the	 leader’s	rule	 in-
definitely,	which	 can	 only	 be	 limited	 by	 a	 “human	 factor”.	 The	
experience	of	the	last	15	years	of	Russia’s	history	shows	that	‘ex-



































may	 result	 in	 the	 accumulation	of	negative	 factors	 and,	 in	 con-
sequence,	an	extensive crisis of the state.	While	 it	 is	probable	
that	 in	 the	 aftermath	 of	 such	 a	 crisis	 the	 country’s	 leadership	
may	be	replaced,	a	systemic change leading	to	the	formation	of	




could	 offer	 a	 programme	 for	 a	 deep	 reform	 of	 the	 state	model,	
even	among	the	opposition.	The	political	projects	that	exist,	such	
as	those	of	Alexei	Navalny	or	the	émigré	Mikhail	Khodorkovsky,	
are	general	and	do	not	have	many	supporters,	which	means	that	
at	this	stage	they	are	simply	utopian.	A	new	leadership	could	only	
be	‘ushered’	into	the	Kremlin	by	members	of	the	current	ruling	
elite,	who	are	likely	to	opt	for	systemic	and	personal	continuity.
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